Comparison Overview

Bright Realty

VS

Shimao Group

Bright Realty

4400 State Highway 121 Byp, Lewisville, Texas, 75067, US
Last Update: 2025-05-06 (UTC)
Between 900 and 1000

Excellent

At Bright Realty, we believe in driving results by developing, owning and operating communities that will last for generations. Led by a family legacy of integrity and dedication, the Bright Realty team acts as developer, owner and operator of our residential and commercial developments.

NAICS: None
NAICS Definition: Others
Employees: 157
Subsidiaries: 0
12-month incidents
0
Known data breaches
0
Attack type number
0

Shimao Group

None
Last Update: 2025-06-06 (UTC)

Excellent

Between 900 and 1000

Shimao Group has entered the real estate industry since 1989, After more than 30 years of development, the Group has made its layout in more than 100 core development cities across China, involving real estate, commercial, property management, hotel, theme entertainment and culture. Following the national strategy, Shimao continuously provides customers with high-level quality experience in living, life, consumption, business and tourism, leading the lifestyle and serving a better life.

NAICS: None
NAICS Definition: Others
Employees: 11
Subsidiaries: 0
12-month incidents
0
Known data breaches
0
Attack type number
0

Compliance Badges Comparison

Security & Compliance Standards Overview

https://images.rankiteo.com/companyimages/bright-realty.jpeg
Bright Realty
ISO 27001
Not verified
SOC 2
Not verified
GDPR
No public badge
PCI DSS
No public badge
https://images.rankiteo.com/companyimages/世茂房地产.jpeg
Shimao Group
ISO 27001
Not verified
SOC 2
Not verified
GDPR
No public badge
PCI DSS
No public badge
Compliance Summary
Bright Realty
100%
Compliance Rate
0/4 Standards Verified
Shimao Group
0%
Compliance Rate
0/4 Standards Verified

Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals

Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Average (This Year)

No incidents recorded for Bright Realty in 2025.

Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Average (This Year)

No incidents recorded for Shimao Group in 2025.

Incident History — Bright Realty (X = Date, Y = Severity)

Bright Realty cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

Incident History — Shimao Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)

Shimao Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

Notable Incidents

Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company

https://images.rankiteo.com/companyimages/bright-realty.jpeg
Bright Realty
Incidents

No Incident

https://images.rankiteo.com/companyimages/世茂房地产.jpeg
Shimao Group
Incidents

No Incident

FAQ

Both Bright Realty company and Shimao Group company demonstrate a comparable AI risk posture, with strong governance and monitoring frameworks in place.

Historically, Shimao Group company has disclosed a higher number of cyber incidents compared to Bright Realty company.

In the current year, Shimao Group company and Bright Realty company have not reported any cyber incidents.

Neither Shimao Group company nor Bright Realty company has reported experiencing a ransomware attack publicly.

Neither Shimao Group company nor Bright Realty company has reported experiencing a data breach publicly.

Neither Shimao Group company nor Bright Realty company has reported experiencing targeted cyberattacks publicly.

Neither Bright Realty company nor Shimao Group company has reported experiencing or disclosing vulnerabilities publicly.

Neither Bright Realty company nor Shimao Group company has publicly disclosed detailed information about the number of their subsidiaries.

Bright Realty company employs more people globally than Shimao Group company, reflecting its scale as a Real Estate.

Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)

Description

Apache Geode is vulnerable to CSRF attacks through GET requests to the Management and Monitoring REST API that could allow an attacker who has tricked a user into giving up their Geode session credentials to submit malicious commands on the target system on behalf of the authenticated user. This issue affects Apache Geode: versions 1.10 through 1.15.1 Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.15.2, which fixes the issue.

Description

The Related Posts Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via admin settings in all versions up to, and including, 1.12 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level permissions and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. This only affects multi-site installations and installations where unfiltered_html has been disabled.

Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 4.4
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Description

The Theme Editor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 3.0. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the 'theme_editor_theme' page. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 8.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Description

A vulnerability has been found in Nixdorf Wincor PORT IO Driver up to 1.0.0.1. This affects the function sub_11100 in the library wnport.sys of the component IOCTL Handler. Such manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 3.0.0.1 is able to mitigate this issue. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. The vendor was contacted beforehand and was able to provide a patch very early.

Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 6.8
Severity: LOW
AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
cvss3
Base: 7.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
cvss4
Base: 8.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mscc: ocelot: Fix use-after-free caused by cyclic delayed work The origin code calls cancel_delayed_work() in ocelot_stats_deinit() to cancel the cyclic delayed work item ocelot->stats_work. However, cancel_delayed_work() may fail to cancel the work item if it is already executing. While destroy_workqueue() does wait for all pending work items in the work queue to complete before destroying the work queue, it cannot prevent the delayed work item from being rescheduled within the ocelot_check_stats_work() function. This limitation exists because the delayed work item is only enqueued into the work queue after its timer expires. Before the timer expiration, destroy_workqueue() has no visibility of this pending work item. Once the work queue appears empty, destroy_workqueue() proceeds with destruction. When the timer eventually expires, the delayed work item gets queued again, leading to the following warning: workqueue: cannot queue ocelot_check_stats_work on wq ocelot-switch-stats WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:2255 __queue_work+0x875/0xaf0 ... RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x875/0xaf0 ... RSP: 0018:ffff88806d108b10 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000101 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88806d123e88 RBP: ffffffff813c3170 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed100da247d2 R10: ffffed100da247d1 R11: ffff88806d123e8b R12: ffff88800c00f000 R13: ffff88800d7285c0 R14: ffff88806d0a5580 R15: ffff88800d7285a0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880e5725000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe18e45ea10 CR3: 0000000005e6c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? kasan_report+0xc6/0xf0 ? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 call_timer_fn+0x25/0x1c0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x3be/0x8c0 ? __pfx_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_sched_clock_irq+0xb06/0x27d0 ? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10 ? try_to_wake_up+0xb15/0x1960 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x603/0x7e0 ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10 ? sched_balance_trigger+0x1c0/0x9f0 ? sched_tick+0x221/0x5a0 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 ? tick_nohz_handler+0x339/0x440 ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10 __walk_groups.isra.0+0x42/0x150 tmigr_handle_remote+0x1f4/0x2e0 ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x60/0x140 ? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20 ? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0 ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x322/0x780 handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550 irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80 </IRQ> ... The following diagram reveals the cause of the above warning: CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback) mscc_ocelot_remove() | ocelot_deinit() | ocelot_check_stats_work() ocelot_stats_deinit() | cancel_delayed_work()| ... | queue_delayed_work() destroy_workqueue() | (wait a time) | __queue_work() //UAF The above scenario actually constitutes a UAF vulnerability. The ocelot_stats_deinit() is only invoked when initialization failure or resource destruction, so we must ensure that any delayed work items cannot be rescheduled. Replace cancel_delayed_work() with disable_delayed_work_sync() to guarantee proper cancellation of the delayed work item and ensure completion of any currently executing work before the workqueue is deallocated. A deadlock concern was considered: ocelot_stats_deinit() is called in a process context and is not holding any locks that the delayed work item might also need. Therefore, the use of the _sync() variant is safe here. This bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the issue and validate the fix, I simulated ocelot-swit ---truncated---