Comparison Overview

Better Auth is an authentication and authorization library for TypeScript. In versions prior to 1.3.26, unauthenticated attackers can create or modify API keys for any user by passing that user's id in the request body to the `api/auth/api-key/create` route. `session?.user ?? (authRequired ? null : { id: ctx.body.userId })`. When no session exists but `userId` is present in the request body, `authRequired` becomes false and the user object is set to the attacker-controlled ID. Server-only field validation only executes when `authRequired` is true (lines 280-295), allowing attackers to set privileged fields. No additional authentication occurs before the database operation, so the malicious payload is accepted. The same pattern exists in the update endpoint. This is a critical authentication bypass enabling full an unauthenticated attacker can generate an API key for any user and immediately gain complete authenticated access. This allows the attacker to perform any action as the victim user using the api key, potentially compromise the user data and the application depending on the victim's privileges. Version 1.3.26 contains a patch for the issue.

• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/556085067609c508f8c546ceef9003ee8c607d39
• https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-99h5-pjcv-gr6v

Allstar is a GitHub App to set and enforce security policies. In versions prior to 4.5, a vulnerability in Allstar’s Reviewbot component caused inbound webhook requests to be validated against a hard-coded, shared secret. The value used for the secret token was compiled into the Allstar binary and could not be configured at runtime. In practice, this meant that every deployment using Reviewbot would validate requests with the same secret unless the operator modified source code and rebuilt the component - an expectation that is not documented and is easy to miss. All Allstar releases prior to v4.5 that include the Reviewbot code path are affected. Deployments on v4.5 and later are not affected. Those who have not enabled or exposed the Reviewbot endpoint are not exposed to this issue.

• https://github.com/ossf/allstar/blob/294ae985cc2facd0918e8d820e4196021aa0b914/pkg/reviewbot/reviewbot.go#L59
• https://github.com/ossf/allstar/commit/e004ecb540d63ca6f5b1689b41af6c0040a82c73
• https://github.com/ossf/allstar/pull/713
• https://github.com/ossf/allstar/security/advisories/GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr

Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities with Calendar events in Liferay Portal 7.4.3.35 through 7.4.3.111, and Liferay DXP 2023.Q4.0 through 2023.Q4.5, 2023.Q3.1 through 2023.Q3.7, 7.4 update 35 through update 92, and 7.3 update 25 through update 36 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted payload injected into a user’s (1) First Name, (2) Middle Name or (3) Last Name text field.

• https://liferay.dev/portal/security/known-vulnerabilities/-/asset_publisher/jekt/content/CVE-2025-62240

Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. In versions prior to 5.6.0, upon authentication, the user could be associated by e-mail even if the `associate_by_email` pipeline was not included. This could lead to account compromise when a third-party authentication service does not validate provided e-mail addresses or doesn't require unique e-mail addresses. Version 5.6.0 contains a patch. As a workaround, review the authentication service policy on e-mail addresses; many will not allow exploiting this vulnerability.

• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/commit/10c80e2ebabeccd4e9c84ad0e16e1db74148ed4c
• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/issues/220
• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/issues/231
• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/issues/634
• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/pull/803
• https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/security/advisories/GHSA-wv4w-6qv2-qqfg

Confidential Containers's Trustee project contains tools and components for attesting confidential guests and providing secrets to them. In versions prior to 0.15.0, the attestation-policy endpoint didn't check if the kbs-client submitting the request was actually authenticated (had the right key). This allowed any kbs-client to actually change the attestation policy. Version 0.15.0 fixes the issue.

• https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee/commit/3a7d04a70918fa503a00974dcae653cf9f0640e0
• https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee/pull/957
• https://github.com/confidential-containers/trustee/security/advisories/GHSA-49mc-2q77-m99x