Adobe Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ADO4393043111125)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Adobe breach identified under incident ID ADO4393043111125.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Adobe's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/adobe, the number of followers: 5196309, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 40571 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 825 and after the incident was 817 with a difference of -8 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Adobe and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Sophisticated Phishing Campaign Exploiting Global and Regional Brands for Credential Theft via HTML Attachments", has drawn attention.

A recent investigation by Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) uncovered a sophisticated phishing campaign exploiting globally recognized and regional brands (e.g., Adobe, Microsoft, DHL) to steal user credentials.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing User Credentials (Email/Password), IP Addresses and User-Agent Data.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Block HTML Attachments at Email Gateway, Restrict Access to Telegram API and Retroactive Review of User Activity for Compromise Signs, and began remediation that includes User Training on Evolving Phishing Tactics, Enhanced Email Vetting Procedures and Integration of Threat Intelligence Feeds, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public Advisory via Cyble Reports and Media Outreach (Google News, LinkedIn, X).

The case underscores how Ongoing (Active Campaign), teams are taking away lessons such as HTML attachments can bypass traditional security controls (e.g., URL filtering), Telegram Bot API abuse complicates detection by decentralizing C2 infrastructure and Brand impersonation with regional/localized templates increases campaign effectiveness, and recommending next steps like Block HTML attachments at email gateways or quarantine for inspection, Restrict outbound traffic to Telegram API endpoints where possible and Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to mitigate stolen credential risks, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Security Teams: Update email filtering rules and monitor Telegram API traffic and Executives: Allocate resources for user training and threat intelligence integration.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including hTML attachments (e.g., RFQ_4460-INQUIRY.HTML) disguised as procurement documents, and phishing Emails with HTML Attachments under initial_access_broker and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating fake login prompts (e.g., Adobe-themed) embedded in HTML attachments. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including javaScript embedded within the files to harvest login credentials, and malware (HTML/JavaScript-based) under incident type. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including tricked into re-entering credentials via fake login prompts, and user Credentials (Email/Password) under data_compromised and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating javaScript embedded within the files to harvest login credentials. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including encrypted payloads (CryptoJS AES), and modular toolkits, AES encryption under lessons_learned, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including disguised as procurement documents (e.g., RFQs or invoices), and brand impersonation with regional/localized templates, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating anti-forensics techniques (blocking keyboard shortcuts, browser tools). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exfiltrating the data to attacker-controlled Telegram bots via HTTP POST requests, and telegram Bot API for Exfiltration under attack_vector and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hTTP POST requests to Telegram (non-traditional C2). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating modular design allowed rapid adaptation to other brands (implies dynamic payload updates) and Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including hTTP POST requests to Telegram Bot API, and abuse complicates detection by decentralizing C2 infrastructure. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Malicious Services: Service Exfiltration (T1659) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating abuse of Telegram Bot API for exfiltration (legitimate service repurposed) and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including potential Account Takeovers under operational_impact, and stolen credentials enable account hijacking. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating downstream account takeovers, fraud, or lateral attacks implies credential reuse. Under the Reconnaissance tactic, the analysis identified Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Service (T1598.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including targets include industries across Central/Eastern Europe (tailored lures), and procurement/Finance Teams (via RFQ/Invoice Lures) under high_value_targets. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.