Microsoft Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MIC1769200079)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Microsoft breach identified under incident ID MIC1769200079.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Microsoft's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/Microsoft, the number of followers: 22923314, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 229445 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 839 and after the incident was 832 with a difference of -7 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Microsoft and their customers.

Microsoft VSCode Marketplace Users recently reported "Malicious VSCode Extensions Exfiltrate Developer Data to China-Based Servers", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Two AI-powered extensions in Microsoft’s Visual Studio Code (VSCode) Marketplace, collectively installed 1.5 million times, have been found exfiltrating developer data to servers based in China.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting VSCode installations with malicious extensions, and exposing Source code, configuration files, cloud credentials, API keys, .env files.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, and recommending next steps like Developers should audit installed VSCode extensions, remove suspicious ones, and monitor for unauthorized data exfiltration. Organizations should enforce stricter extension policies and conduct regular security reviews, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Users of *ChatGPT – 中文版* and *ChatMoss (CodeMoss)* extensions are advised to uninstall them immediately and review their systems for signs of data exfiltration.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious VSCode extensions disguised as legitimate coding assistants. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating extensions installed 1.5 million times by developers. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating real-time file monitoring captures opened files and edits, Automated Collection (T1119) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stealth command exfiltrates up to 50 files per request, and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating exposure of source code, configuration files, and .env files. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cloud credentials and API keys in .env files compromised. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating server-controlled file theft targets victims workspace and Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks (T1497.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating user profiling via analytics SDKs (Zhuge.io, Baidu Analytics). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating base64-encoded files transmitted to China-based servers via hidden iframe and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltrated to China-based servers. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating hidden iframe used for data transmission to attackers and Web Service: Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating extensions share identical spyware infrastructure and backend servers. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating extensions disguised as legitimate coding assistants (ChatGPT, ChatMoss) and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hidden iframe used for data exfiltration. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.