Viapath Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (VIA1292112111125)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Viapath breach identified under incident ID VIA1292112111125.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Viapath's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/viapath-llp, the number of followers: 7271, the industry type: Hospitals and Health Care and the number of employees: 272 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 660 and after the incident was 517 with a difference of -143 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Viapath and their customers.

On 01 January 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "Rise in Qilin Ransomware Incidents Targeting SMBs in Construction, Healthcare, and Financial Sectors" came to light.

Cybersecurity researchers at S-RM have observed a rise in ransomware incidents linked to the Qilin ransomware group, a long-running ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing True.

In response, and began remediation that includes regularly patch and update VPNs and remote access devices, apply MFA to all accounts and limit or remove exposed management interfaces.

The case underscores how ongoing (S-RM research), teams are taking away lessons such as Qilin operates as a professionalized RaaS 'tech business' with profit-sharing affiliates, increasing attribution complexity, Basic security gaps (e.g., unpatched VPNs, lack of MFA) remain primary attack vectors and Collaboration among cybercrime groups (e.g., Scattered Spider deploying Qilin) amplifies threat sophistication, and recommending next steps like Regularly patch and update VPNs and remote access devices, Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts and Limit or eliminate exposed management interfaces, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering S-RM advisory on Qilin RaaS trends (published 2025-01-01).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exploited unpatched VPN vulnerabilities, and unpatched VPN appliances in attack_vector, Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA), and single-factor remote access tools enabled access, and External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exposed management interfaces used for entry, and remote access tools in attack_vector. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including lack of MFA suggests credential reuse/post-compromise persistence, and raaS affiliates (e.g., Scattered Spider) known for credential abuse. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including unpatched VPN vulnerabilities likely enabled privilege elevation, and ransomware deployment requires admin-level access. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including ransomware (Qilin) typically disables security tools pre-encryption, and prolonged outages suggest defensive measures were evaded and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating raaS groups often delete logs/artifacts; implied by sophistication. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including lack of MFA increases likelihood of credential harvesting, and scattered Spider known for credential-theft tools (e.g., Mimikatz) and OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating raaS affiliates (e.g., Scattered Spider) use LSASS dumping for lateral movement. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data theft and system encryption implies reconnaissance for high-value files and Remote System Discovery (T1018) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement mentioned in remediation measures. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including monitor proactively for lateral movement in remediation, and rDP commonly abused by RaaS groups post-initial access and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposed management interfaces could include SSH for movement. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including data theft explicitly confirmed in incident_details, and sensitive medical records exfiltrated and Data Staged: Local Data Staging (T1074.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration requires staging; implied by data theft and encryption. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including dark-web platforms used for C2/exfiltration, and qilin RaaS known to use HTTPS/Tor for C2 and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups encrypt C2 traffic; implied by sophistication. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1048.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including data published on dark-web leak sites, and qilin uses cloud/Telegram for exfiltration and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating expanded extortion channels to include Telegram suggests non-traditional exfiltration. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including data theft and system encryption explicitly stated, and qilin ransomware attack confirms encryption, Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating system encryption may include partial destruction of unencrypted backups, and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including prolonged outages suggest recovery mechanisms were targeted, and ransomware often deletes shadow copies/backups. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.