535
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SK-3932739091625Incident Details -
Type
Data Breach Fraud (Mobile Payment) Unauthorized Access Social Engineering (Rogue Base Stations)
Attack Vector
Hacking (Claimed by Scattered Lapsus$) Rogue Cellular Base Stations (KT Incident) Interception of Payment Verifications
Vulnerability Exploited
Unknown (SK Telecom denies breach) Weakness in Mobile Payment Verification Process (KT)
Motivation
Financial Gain (Data Sale by Scattered Lapsus$) Fraud (KT Mobile Payment Breach)
Impact
Kt: 170,000,000 KRW (~$122,460 USD) Sk Telecom: Claimed: 27 million user records (100 GB sample offered for $10,000; includes user IDs, full names, phone numbers, emails, addresses, birthdates) Kt: 5,561 users' IMSI data potentially compromised Market share drop for SK Telecom (below 40% for the first time in a decade) Customer anxiety and potential churn for both carriers Regulatory scrutiny and investigations by Ministry of Science and ICT Growing concerns from consumers Daily checks for unauthorized payments by KT users Anxiety over potential future breaches Erosion of trust in SK Telecom and KT Negative media coverage Potential subscriber churn coinciding with iPhone 17 launch High (if SK Telecom data breach claims are true) Moderate (KT IMSI data compromise) High (KT fraudulent transactions) Low (SK Telecom denies breach)
Response
SK Telecom: Denied breach, working with authorities KT: High-profile apology, cooperation with Ministry of Science and ICT Ministry of Science and ICT investigating SK Telecom incident KT collaborating with authorities SK Telecom: Public denial of breach, transparency pledge KT: Public apology, ongoing updates
Data Breach
SK Telecom (claimed): User IDs, full names, phone numbers, emails, addresses, birthdates KT: International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) data SK Telecom: 27 million (claimed) KT: 5,561 (IMSI data) Sensitivity Of Data: High (PII for SK Telecom; IMSI for KT) SK Telecom: Claimed 100 GB sample (denied by company) KT: Unclear (IMSI data potentially intercepted) SK Telecom: FTP screenshots, sample datasets (fabricated, per company) KT: Unknown SK Telecom: User IDs, full names, phone numbers, emails, addresses, birthdates (claimed) KT: IMSI data (5,561 users)
Regulatory Compliance
Ministry of Science and ICT investigating SK Telecom KT reporting to authorities
Investigation Status
Ongoing (Ministry of Science and ICT leading investigations for both incidents)
Customer Advisories
KT users advised to monitor accounts for unauthorized transactions General anxiety among telecom users in South Korea
Stakeholder Advisories
SK Telecom: Reassuring users, denying breach claims KT: Apology issued, monitoring for further fraud
Initial Access Broker
SK Telecom: Unverified (claimed by Scattered Lapsus$) KT: Rogue cellular base stations intercepting payment verifications SK Telecom: Customer database (claimed) KT: Mobile payment verification system Data Sold On Dark Web: SK Telecom: Claimed 100 GB sample offered for $10,000 on Telegram (denied by company)
References
535
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SK-1802718100125Incident Details -
Type
Data Breach Ransomware Espionage Phishing Supply Chain Attack Unauthorized Access
Attack Vector
Website Exploitation Spear-Phishing (AI Deepfakes) Fake Base Stations Ransomware Credential Stuffing Social Engineering Malware
Motivation
Financial Gain Espionage Data Theft Disruption Cyber Warfare
Impact
$6.2 million (Wemix) Operational costs for SIM replacements (SK Telecom) Revenue loss during downtime (Yes24, SGI, Welrix F&I) 90,000 customer records (GS Retail: names, birth dates, contact details, addresses, emails) 23 million customer records (SK Telecom: personal data) 20,000 resumes (Albamon: names, phone numbers, emails) 200GB of data (Lotte Card: ~3 million customers) 1TB+ internal files (Welrix F&I: sensitive customer data) Subscriber data (KT: IMSI, IMEI, phone numbers, micro-payment fraud) Diplomatic communications (19 embassies: espionage via fake emails) GS Retail (website) Wemix (blockchain infrastructure) Albamon (job platform database) SK Telecom (customer data systems) Yes24 (ticketing/retail platform, twice) Seoul Guarantee Insurance (core systems: guarantees, verification) Lotte Card (credit/debit card systems) Welrix F&I (lending systems) KT (mobile network via fake base stations) South Korean military/defense institutions (deepfake phishing) 4 days (Yes24, June 2025) Few hours (Yes24, August 2025) Days (Seoul Guarantee Insurance, July 2025) Weeks (SK Telecom SIM replacements, April–May 2025) Service disruptions (Yes24, SGI, Welrix F&I) Customer verification delays (SGI) Fraudulent micro-payments (KT) Diplomatic communications compromise (embassies) Yes24 (ticketing/retail sales) Welrix F&I (lending operations) Lotte Card (customer trust/transaction volume) SK Telecom (SIM replacement process) Lotte Card (data exposure) Yes24 (repeated outages) SK Telecom Lotte Card Yes24 Welrix F&I KT South Korean government (fragmented response) Potential GDPR-like fines (if applicable) Class-action lawsuits (e.g., SK Telecom, Lotte Card) GS Retail (90,000 customers) SK Telecom (23M customers) Lotte Card (3M customers) Albamon (20,000 users) Lotte Card (credit/debit data) KT (unauthorized micro-payments)
Response
Partial (company-level) Delayed (government-level) Cybersecurity firms (e.g., Theori, Genians) KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency) Yes (select cases) Delayed in some incidents (e.g., Lotte Card: 17-day delay) SIM card replacements (SK Telecom) System isolations (SGI, Yes24) Network segmentation (KT) Dark web monitoring (Welrix F&I) Customer notifications (GS Retail, Albamon) Credit monitoring offers (Lotte Card) Patch management (where applicable) Service restoration (Yes24, SGI) Fraudulent transaction reversals (KT) Diplomatic cybersecurity advisories (embassies) Delayed disclosures (Wemix: 5-day delay) Public statements (SK Telecom, Lotte Card) Presidential Office announcements (September 2025) KT (post-fake base station attack) KISA-led initiatives Embassy network traffic
Data Breach
Personal Identifiable Information (PII) Financial Data Resume/Employment Data Diplomatic Communications Mobile Subscriber Data (IMSI, IMEI) Internal Corporate Files 90,000 (GS Retail) 23,000,000 (SK Telecom) 20,000 (Albamon) 3,000,000 (Lotte Card) 5,500 (KT) High (PII, financial, diplomatic) Medium (resumes, subscriber data) Yes (GS Retail, Lotte Card, Welrix F&I) Likely (SK Telecom, KT) Databases PDFs (resumes) Emails Transaction logs Internal documents Names Birth dates Addresses Phone numbers Email addresses IMSI/IMEI
Regulatory Compliance
Potential violations of South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) Financial sector regulations Investigations ongoing (e.g., Lotte Card, SK Telecom) Delayed in some cases New legal powers proposed (September 2025)
Lessons Learned
Fragmented government response exacerbates cyber risks. Lack of a centralized 'first responder' agency delays containment. Skilled cybersecurity workforce shortage hinders proactive defenses. Reactive measures (e.g., SIM replacements) are costly and insufficient. AI-generated deepfakes pose emerging threats for espionage/phishing. Cross-ministerial coordination is critical for national cyber resilience.
Recommendations
Establish a central cybersecurity authority with technical and strategic oversight. Mandate real-time breach reporting (even without company disclosures). Invest in workforce development (e.g., cybersecurity training programs). Implement hybrid model: central strategy + independent agency execution (e.g., KISA). Enhance public-private collaboration for threat intelligence sharing. Prioritize proactive defenses (e.g., AI-driven anomaly detection, zero-trust architecture). Conduct regular red-team exercises for critical infrastructure.
Investigation Status
Ongoing (multiple agencies) Interagency plan announced (September 2025)
Customer Advisories
SK Telecom: Free SIM card replacements for 23M customers. Lotte Card: Credit monitoring services for affected customers. Yes24: Service restoration updates and compensation offers. GS Retail/Albamon: Identity theft protection recommendations.
Stakeholder Advisories
Presidential Office: Cross-ministerial cyber defense initiative (September 2025). KISA: Enhanced monitoring for critical infrastructure. Financial Supervisory Service: Audits for Lotte Card, Welrix F&I.
Initial Access Broker
Compromised websites (GS Retail) Phishing emails (Kimsuky) Fake base stations (KT) Exploited vulnerabilities (Yes24, SGI) Months (Kimsuky embassy espionage) Weeks (Lotte Card: 17 days undetected) Likely (Welrix F&I, KT) Financial data (Lotte Card, Welrix F&I) Diplomatic communications (embassies) Military/defense institutions Yes (Welrix F&I: samples leaked)
Post Incident Analysis
Lack of centralized cybersecurity governance. Silos between government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Science and ICT, KISA, National Security Office). Insufficient investment in proactive defenses (e.g., threat hunting, red teaming). Delayed breach detection (e.g., Lotte Card: 17 days). Over-reliance on reactive measures (e.g., SIM replacements). Skilled workforce shortage due to systemic underinvestment. Political deadlock prioritizing short-term fixes over long-term resilience. Presidential Office-led interagency cyber defense plan (September 2025). Proposed legal reforms to enable preemptive government probes. Increased funding for KISA and cybersecurity workforce development. Mandatory breach reporting timelines. Public-private cybersecurity task forces (e.g., with SK Telecom, Theori). Pilot programs for AI-driven threat detection (e.g., deepfake phishing). Hybrid governance model: central strategy + decentralized execution.
References
535
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SK-2162921092525Incident Details -
Type
Data Breach Micropayment Scam Unauthorized Access Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
Attack Vector
Network Infiltration SIM Swapping (Micropayment Scam) Advanced Hacking Tools Data Exfiltration
Motivation
Financial Gain (Micropayment Scams) Data Theft for Resale (Dark Web) Espionage (potential, given U.S. military customer involvement)
Impact
SIM Card Data (10+ GB from SK Telecom) Customer Identity/Financial Information (KT Micropayment Scam) Large-Scale Customer Data (LG Uplus, under investigation) 42,000+ servers inspected (SK Telecom) 28 servers infected with advanced hacking tools (SK Telecom) Joint public-private investigation (KT Corp.) U.S. Forces Korea advisory issued (SK Telecom, April 2025) Customer Complaints: Increased public anxiety reported Brand Reputation Impact: High (multiple breaches at major providers, U.S. military customers affected) Identity Theft Risk: High (SIM swapping, micropayment scams) Payment Information Risk: High (micropayment scams, financial data exposure)
Response
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Joint public-private investigation team for KT Corp.) Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (MSIT-led investigation) Server inspections (42,000+ for SK Telecom) Identification of 28 infected servers (SK Telecom) Public advisories (MSIT news releases on 2025-09-09 and 2025-09-16) U.S. Forces Korea advisory (April 2025, SK Telecom only)
Data Breach
SIM Card Data Customer Identity Information Financial Information (Micropayment Scams) Potential PII (under investigation for LG Uplus) Sensitivity Of Data: High (includes PII, financial data, and potential military-affiliated customer data) Data Exfiltration: Yes (10+ GB from SK Telecom, alleged dark web sales) Personally Identifiable Information: Yes (SIM data, identity/financial info from micropayment scams)
Regulatory Compliance
Regulatory Notifications: Yes (MSIT investigations, public disclosures)
Investigation Status
['Ongoing (MSIT-led joint investigation for KT Corp.; probes for SK Telecom and LG Uplus)']
Stakeholder Advisories
U.S. Forces Korea advisory (April 2025, SK Telecom) MSIT public releases (2025-09-09 and 2025-09-16)
Initial Access Broker
Backdoors Established: Yes (28 servers infected with advanced hacking tools at SK Telecom) High Value Targets: Potential (U.S. military customers) Data Sold On Dark Web: Alleged (SK Telecom customer data)
References