Oracle Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ORA4332743112125)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Oracle breach identified under incident ID ORA4332743112125.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Oracle's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/micros-systems-inc, the number of followers: 10879759, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 190989 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 729 and after the incident was 729 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Oracle and their customers.

Oracle Corporation recently reported "Clop Ransomware Exploits Zero-Day CVE-2025-61882 in Oracle E-Business Suite", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

The Clop ransomware gang (Graceful Spider) breached Oracle Corporation's internal systems by exploiting a critical zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61882) in Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS).

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Oracle E-Business Suite (Versions 12.2.3–12.2.14) and Internal Corporate Systems, and exposing Financial Records, Personal Records and ERP Data.

In response, and began remediation that includes Patch released in October 2025 Security Alert.

The case underscores how Ongoing (infrastructure analysis links to prior MOVEit attacks).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including exploited a critical zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-61882) in Oracle E-Business Suite, and unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) flaw via OA_HTML/SyncServlet and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bypass authentication via OA_HTML/SyncServlet (implied abuse of ERP system accounts). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating inject malicious XSLT templates through OA_HTML/RF.jsp, granting full control. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating inject malicious XSLT templates via RF.jsp (implied web shell functionality). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating rCE flaw allowed attackers to bypass authentication... granting full control over ERP data. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating bypass authentication (abuse of legitimate ERP system access) and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating full control over sensitive ERP data (implied defensive tool tampering). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating full control over ERP data (potential access to stored credentials in EBS). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating high-value targets such as ERP Data, Financial Records, Personal Records (implied reconnaissance). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including financial Records, Personal Records, ERP Data compromised, and data exfiltration such as Confirmed (threatened release on dark web). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including data exfiltration such as Confirmed (threatened release on dark web), and extortion emails sent via [email protected]. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating clop ransomware gang (implied encryption, though not explicitly confirmed) and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating threatening to release financial and personal records (potential data destruction if demands unmet). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating reused infrastructure from prior MOVEit exploits (96 distinct IPs) (implied internal movement). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including extortion emails sent via [email protected], and 41 subnets reused from MOVEit (C2 infrastructure overlap) and Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services (T1583.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 96 distinct IPs, primarily hosted on Russian-based providers. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.