Meta Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MET5292052111325)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Meta breach identified under incident ID MET5292052111325.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Meta's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/instagram, the number of followers: 11513481, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 140153 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 808 and after the incident was 808 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Meta and their customers.

On 05 November 2025, Meta (WhatsApp) disclosed social engineering, phishing and fraud issues under the banner "WhatsApp Screen-Sharing Scam Exploiting Psychological Manipulation for Financial Theft and Data Breaches".

A fast-spreading screen-sharing scam on WhatsApp exploits the platform's screen-sharing feature (introduced in 2023) to steal money and personal data.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting WhatsApp accounts, user devices (via remote-access tools) and banking apps/websites, and exposing passwords, banking details and one-time passwords (OTPs), plus an estimated financial loss of ['$700,000 (Hong Kong case)', 'massive global losses (unspecified total)'].

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like AI-powered real-time screen-sharing warnings for unsaved contacts, removal of 8M scam-linked accounts and takedown of 21K fake customer service pages, and began remediation that includes user education campaigns and enhanced account security prompts (e.g., Two-Step Verification), and stakeholders are being briefed through public advisories (Meta blog, ESET report) and Reddit community warnings.

The case underscores how ongoing (Meta and ESET actively monitoring), teams are taking away lessons such as Psychological manipulation (trust/urgency) is as critical as technical vulnerabilities in scam success, Default trust in platform features (e.g., screen-sharing) can be weaponized and Proactive AI warnings can mitigate human-error risks but require user compliance, and recommending next steps like Never share screens, passwords, or OTPs with unsolicited callers, even if they impersonate trusted entities, Enable Two-Step Verification on WhatsApp and other critical accounts and Verify suspicious claims via independent, trusted channels (e.g., official bank contacts), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Meta’s public safety updates and ESET’s threat analysis.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing via Service (T1566.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating whatsApp video call from unsaved number impersonating bank employees or Meta support agents and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 8 million scam-linked accounts and 21,000 fake customer service pages exploited for impersonation. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (Remote Access Tools) (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating trick victims into ... installing remote-access tools like AnyDesk or TeamViewer. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating remote-access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer) used to maintain access. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scammers steal passwords, banking details, and one-time passwords (OTPs) via remote access and Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation (T1621) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating steal ... one-time passwords (OTPs) during active sessions. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Screen Capture (T1113) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating exploits the platform’s screen-sharing feature to deceive users into granting scammers remote access and Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating steal banking credentials, passwords, and OTPs from compromised devices. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating remote-access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer) used to transmit stolen data (credentials, OTPs, banking details). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Reflection Amplification (T1620) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating psychological manipulation—trust, urgency, and panic to amplify victim compliance, Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (0%), and Account Access Removal (T1659) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating account takeover via stolen credentials/OTPs leading to massive financial losses. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fake customer service pages (21K) to legitimize impersonation attempts and Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools (T1027.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating use of legitimate remote-access tools (AnyDesk/TeamViewer) to evade detection. Under the Social Engineering tactic, the analysis identified Account Access Removal (T1531) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating psychological manipulation—trust, urgency, and panic to coerce screen-sharing/OTP disclosure and Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating scammers posed as trusted entities (e.g., bank employees or Meta support agents) via WhatsApp calls. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.