DoorDash Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (DOO2492524111725)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the DoorDash breach identified under incident ID DOO2492524111725.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of DoorDash's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/doordash-for-business, the number of followers: 1424762, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 74124 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 766 and after the incident was 766 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on DoorDash and their customers.

On 07 November 2024, DoorDash disclosed Email Spoofing, HTML Injection and Phishing Vector issues under the banner "DoorDash Email Spoofing Vulnerability Enabling Phishing Campaigns".

A vulnerability in DoorDash's systems allowed unauthorized users to send 'official' DoorDash-themed emails directly from the company's authorized servers ([email protected]).

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting DoorDash for Business Platform and Email Servers ([email protected]), and exposing None, with nearly 0 records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Patch Applied to Input Validation in DoorDash for Business Backend and HTML Sanitization in Email Templates, and began remediation that includes Closed Vulnerable Budget Name Input Field and Enhanced Email Template Rendering Security, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public Statement to BleepingComputer and No Direct Customer Notification Mentioned.

The case underscores how Resolved (Vulnerability Patched, Disclosure Dispute Ongoing), teams are taking away lessons such as Importance of Timely Vulnerability Triage and Patch Management, Need for Clear Communication Channels Between Researchers and Companies and Risks of Misaligned Expectations in Bug Bounty Programs (Scope vs. Compensation), and recommending next steps like Expand Bug Bounty Program Scope to Include Email-Related Vulnerabilities, Implement Automated Sanitization for All User-Supplied Input in Email Templates and Establish Escalation Protocols for Disputed Vulnerability Reports.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including fully branded, official-looking emails from [email protected] by injecting arbitrary HTML, and highly convincing phishing channel targeting customers/merchants and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including unpatched flaw in DoorDash for Business platform via Budget name input field, and stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Email Templates. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Browser Extensions (T1176) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating stored HTML Injection could persist in email templates until patched (15+ months). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including emails bypassed spam filters and appeared legitimate from [email protected], and fully branded, official-looking emails. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating hTML injection could enable phishing attacks to harvest credentials/session tokens. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Compromise Accounts: Online Portals (T1584.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating risk of phishing attacks targeting customers/merchants for account takeover and Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exhaustion (T1499.004) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating large-scale phishing attacks could overwhelm support systems (hypothetical). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.