Apollo Gold Corp is a mining & metals company based out of 5655 S Yosemite St # 200, Greenwood Vlg, Colorado, United States.
Our story began in 1874, when we first supplied explosives to the Victorian goldfields in Australia. Since then, we have grown to become one of the world’s leading mining and infrastructure solutions providers. From the production and supply of explosives, blasting systems, mining chemicals and geotechnical monitoring to our cutting-edge digital solutions and comprehensive range of services, we sustainably mobilise the earth’s resources. With 150 years of expertise, our 14,000+ community of engineers, scientists, technologists, operators, business specialists and on-site crew support customers in surface and underground mines, quarry, construction, and oil and gas operations. Sustainability is integral to our operations. Our approach to sustainability begins with ensuring we operate our business responsibly, and by prioritising the safety of our people, customers, and communities. We are in a unique position to leverage our expertise in technology to create safer and more responsible solutions and deliver positive economic, social, and environmental contributions through our business activities.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for Apollo Gold Corp in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Orica in 2025.
Apollo Gold Corp cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Orica cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time, collaborative, markdown notes application. Prior to 1.10.4, some of HedgeDoc's OAuth2 endpoints for social login providers such as Google, GitHub, GitLab, Facebook or Dropbox lack CSRF protection, since they don't send a state parameter and verify the response using this parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.4.
Langflow versions up to and including 1.6.9 contain a chained vulnerability that enables account takeover and remote code execution. An overly permissive CORS configuration (allow_origins='*' with allow_credentials=True) combined with a refresh token cookie configured as SameSite=None allows a malicious webpage to perform cross-origin requests that include credentials and successfully call the refresh endpoint. An attacker-controlled origin can therefore obtain fresh access_token / refresh_token pairs for a victim session. Obtained tokens permit access to authenticated endpoints — including built-in code-execution functionality — allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code and achieve full system compromise.
A vulnerability was detected in xerrors Yuxi-Know up to 0.4.0. This vulnerability affects the function OtherEmbedding.aencode of the file /src/models/embed.py. Performing manipulation of the argument health_url results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The patch is named 0ff771dc1933d5a6b78f804115e78a7d8625c3f3. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor responded with a vulnerability confirmation and a list of security measures they have established already (e.g. disabled URL parsing, disabled URL upload mode, removed URL-to-markdown conversion).
A security vulnerability has been detected in Rarlab RAR App up to 7.11 Build 127 on Android. This affects an unknown part of the component com.rarlab.rar. Such manipulation leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. Upgrading to version 7.20 build 128 is able to mitigate this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. The vendor responded very professional: "This is the real vulnerability affecting RAR for Android only. WinRAR and Unix RAR versions are not affected. We already fixed it in RAR for Android 7.20 build 128 and we publicly mentioned it in that version changelog. (...) To avoid confusion among users, it would be useful if such disclosure emphasizes that it is RAR for Android only issue and WinRAR isn't affected."
A weakness has been identified in ZSPACE Q2C NAS up to 1.1.0210050. Affected by this issue is the function zfilev2_api.OpenSafe of the file /v2/file/safe/open of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. This manipulation of the argument safe_dir causes command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
