SonicWall Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SON5792057112025)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the SonicWall breach identified under incident ID SON5792057112025.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of SonicWall's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/SonicWall, the number of followers: 111355, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 1922 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 685 and after the incident was 685 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on SonicWall and their customers.

On 01 October 2024, SonicWall disclosed Ransomware, Credential Theft and Vulnerability Exploitation issues under the banner "Rise in Ransomware Attacks Exploiting Compromised VPN Credentials in Q3 2024".

A report by Beazley Security highlights that nearly half (48%) of ransomware attacks in Q3 2024 abused compromised VPN credentials as the initial access vector.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SonicWall VPN Devices, Cisco ASA VPN Appliances and Citrix NetScaler Gateways, and exposing Sensitive Configuration Backups (SonicWall Cloud Breach) and Potential PII/Enterprise Data (via Ransomware).

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like MFA Enforcement for Remote Access, Dark Web Monitoring for Leaked Credentials and Patching Critical Vulnerabilities (Cisco/Citrix), and began remediation that includes Credential Rotation for Compromised Accounts, Lockout Policy Enhancements (SonicWall) and VPN/RDP Hardening, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public Report by Beazley Security.

The case underscores how Completed (Beazley Security Analysis), teams are taking away lessons such as MFA is critical for VPN/RDP access but must be universally applied (no exceptions), Dark web monitoring for leaked credentials can preempt attacks and Unpatched enterprise appliances (SonicWall/Cisco/Citrix) are high-value targets, and recommending next steps like Enforce MFA for all remote access solutions (VPN, RDP, etc.) without exceptions, Implement dark web monitoring for leaked credentials and Apply patches promptly for critical vulnerabilities (e.g., Cisco/Citrix), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Beazley Security Report (Public).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including compromised VPN credentials (SSLVPN services) as the primary initial access vector, and sensitive configuration backups of client devices exposed via cloud service, Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating audit and remove default/weak credentials from enterprise appliances, Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including credential stuffing and brute-force techniques targeting weak MFA controls, and brute Force Attacks (Akira, Qilin), Brute Force: Password Spraying (T1110.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including credential Stuffing (Akira), and leaked credentials on the dark web weaponized to deploy ransomware, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exploitation of Enterprise Appliances (INC), and cVE-2025-20333 (Cisco ASA VPN), CVE-2025-7775 (Citrix NetScaler), and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including sEO Poisoning (Rhysida ransomware), and malicious Advertisements. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including backdoors established (Post-Exploitation), and stolen backups to exploit downstream targets and External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including disrupted Remote Access (VPN/RDP), and vPN appliances are prime targets. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including compromised VPN credentials exploited for lateral movement, and weak credential hygiene (reused/weak passwords). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.005) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including credential stuffing attacks, and leaked credentials on the dark web, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including credential Theft (Akira/Qilin), and post-exploitation backdoors likely established, and OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (T1003.008) with moderate confidence (65%), supported by evidence indicating unix/Linux systems potentially targeted via credential theft. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware encryption (file modification/deletion), Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including weak MFA/access controls exploited to bypass defenses, and unpatched systems leveraged for persistence, and Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools (T1027.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware operations typically disable logging/monitoring. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including rDP Credential Compromise (6%), and lateral movement post-compromise and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating enterprise endpoints targeted via stolen credentials. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating sensitive configuration backups exposed (SonicWall Cloud Breach) and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating potential PII/enterprise data collected via ransomware. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including data exfiltration likely (Akira/Qilin double extortion), and configuration backups stolen from cloud service and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups typically exfiltrate before encryption. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including ransomware encryption (Akira/Qilin/INC), and operational outages caused by ransomware and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including potential data leaks (PII/enterprise data), and file deletion/modification during ransomware attack. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including vPN appliances abused for C2 (SonicWall/Cisco), and external service exploitation (24%) and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware C2 typically uses encrypted channels. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.