Rogers Communications Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ROGCYBTES1770724900)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Rogers Communications breach identified under incident ID ROGCYBTES1770724900.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Rogers Communications's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/rogers-communications, the number of followers: 305765, the industry type: Telecommunications and the number of employees: 28375 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 795 and after the incident was 688 with a difference of -107 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Rogers Communications and their customers.

Iron Mountain recently reported "Ransomware Surge in January 2026: Shifting Targets and Emerging Threats", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

January 2026 marked a sharp rise in ransomware activity, with 711 attacks recorded.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing 104 TB, with nearly 13,300 (Mt. Spokane Pediatrics and Pecan Tree Dental) records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Evolving ransomware tactics, shifting focus to high-value sectors, and delayed disclosures obscuring attack timelines.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating finance and tech sectors became prime targets, seeing 24% and 12% increases, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs shifting focus to high-value sectors, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating no specific vector mentioned, but phishing is common in ransomware. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware type attack with data encryption and exfiltration and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware execution (implied by attack type). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs often use compromised credentials for access. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating compromised credentials likely used for privilege escalation and Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware attacks (implied). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains like LockBit and Qilin use obfuscation and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often disables security tools (implied). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating banking data and PII exposed (13,300 records) and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware attacks (implied). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, including market materials and patient records and System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs target high-value data (implied). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, including PII and banking data and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs exfiltrate large volumes of data. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, including 1.4 TB from Iron Mountain and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating common exfiltration method for ransomware gangs. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attack with data encryption confirmed, Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating operation cancellations and patient transfers (AZ Monica), and Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs often deface systems (implied). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.